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ERISA'S DEEMER CLAUSE AND THE QUESTION OF SELF-INSUREDS:
WHAT'S A STATE TO DO?
Reilly v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield United of Wisconsin,
846 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1988)
In Reilly v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield United of Wisconsin,1 the Sev-
enth Circuit joined other federal circuit courts,2 in pronouncing that the
"deemer" clause3 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA)4 preempts state law claims against self-insured5 employee
benefit plans.6
Plaintiffs, a husband and wife, belonged to a self-insured group health
plan administered by Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Wisconsin.7 Blue
Cross denied Mrs. Reilly coverage for an in vitro fertilization procedure.s
1. 846 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1988).
2. For a list of other cases, see infra note 49 and accompanying text.
3. The "deemer" clause is so named because in it Congress forbids any employee benefit plan
from being "deemed" an insurance company, bank, or other investment company for purposes of
any law of any state purporting to regulate such companies. ERISA § 514 (b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144 (b)(2)(B). See infra text accompanying notes 19-22.
4. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1371
(1976 ed, and Supp. V) (original version at 88 Stat. 829), subjects to federal regulation plans provid-
ing employee fringe benefit plans. ERISA is a comprehensive statute designed to promote employ-
ees' interests in their benefit plans. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983). For a
general treatment of ERISA, see G. BOREN, QUALIFIED DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS § 1:04
(1983); T. MCCORD & R. DOREIAN, ERISA PLAN ADMINISTRATORS' DESK BOOK (1983).
5. This Comment will concentrate on self-funded or "self-insured" employee benefit plans.
For an explanation of the different ways a plan can insure itself, see infra note 15.
6. An employee benefit plan can involve either pension benefits, see ERISA § 3(2), 29 U.S.C.
1002(2) (1982); welfare benefits, see ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. 1002(1) (1982); or both. This Com-
ment concerns the state regulation of plans offering insurance-like benefits, falling under ERISA's
welfare benefit category.
7. Although the benefit plan was self-insured, see infra note 15, Blue Cross acted as third party
plan administrator, making benefit payment decisions. Reilly, 846 F.2d at 417.
The plan itself was part of a collective bargaining agreement between the Milwaukee Teachers
Education Association and the Milwaukee Public Schools. This category of self-insured plans in-
volves single entity employers. Reilly does not address the status of group insurance coverage
through a Multiple Employer Trust (MET) or Multiple Employer Benefit Plan. For a general de-
scription of the implications of self-insured METs, see Buchman, Insured and Uninsured METs--
Current Problems, 16 CONN. L. REv. 453 (1983-84). For a general treatment of Multiple Employer
Benefit Plans see CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT AND OTHER EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS 206-
22 (1988).
8. The court held that in vitro fertilization was experimental. The terms of the contract ex-
cluded coverage for experimental and investigative procedures. Reilly, 846 F.2d at 419. Although a
new contract existed, at the time of the in vitro fertilization, the school system had not distributed
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Plaintiffs brought suit,9 charging, inter alia,1° that Blue Cross acted in
bad faith in the administration of the insurance plan."1 Plaintiffs re-
quested punitive damages. 2 In addition, they sought to amend their
complaint to include charges of conspiracy, fraud, and breach of fiduci-
ary duty. 3 The district court found"4 that ERISA preempted these state
claims against a self-insured benefit plan. 5 The Seventh Circuit affirmed
the contract to the Teachers Association, and the court therefore did not apply it. This Comment
does not address whether in vitro fertilization is experimental.
9. The Reillys brought the original suit in state court, but Blue Cross removed the matter to
the federal District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin due to the federal issues involved. Id.
10. The original complaint included state law claims of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress and loss of consortium, both dropped on appeal. Reilly, 846 F.2d at 425. Interestingly, in
affirming the lower court's summary judgment, the appeals court cited Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, (1987). Taylor is the companion case to Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
481 U.S. 41 (1987); see infra notes 41-48 and accompanying text. For a discussion questioning why
the court did not dismiss the plaintiffs' claim of bad faith under like authority, see infra notes 80-86
and accompanying text.
Besides the state law claims, plaintiffs filed an ERISA claim of improper benefit denial. Reilly, 846
F.2d at 417. The court addressed this claim on appeal, but it is beyond the scope of this Comment.
11. Wisconsin, the state in which plaintiffs brought their action, recently developed this claim
of bad faith in failure to perform an insurance contract. In Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85
Wis.2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978), the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized an insurance
carrier's duty, such that breach of the insurance contract might lead to a tort action.
The court later generalized this contract breach leading to a tort to cover potentially any contract
setting. In Autumn Grove Joint Venture v. Rachlin, 138 Wis.2d 273, 405 N.W.2d. 759 (Wis. App),
reh'g denied, 416 N.W.2d 65 (1987), the Wisconsin court recognized the potential for a tort when-
ever a contract duty existed. The Rachlin court treats the Anderson decision as involving a fiduciary
duty.
12. Courts have consistently denied punitive damage claims under ERISA. Note, Punitive
Damages and ERISA: An Anomalous Effect of ERISA s Preemption of Common Law Actions, 65
WASH. U.L.Q. 589, 598 n.64 (1987). The Reillys did not raise this issue. For the Supreme Court's
most recent pronouncement on punitive damages under ERISA, see Massachusetts Mutual Life
Insurance v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985). Brennan's concurrence interprets the decision as only
denying punitive damages under ERISA § 409(a) without addressing their availability under
§ 502(a)(3). Id. at 150-5 1. See also Sanchez, Punitive Damages Under ERISA, 13 W. ST. L. REV.
413 (1986).
13. Reilly, 846 F.2d at 417.
14. The district court opinion was unreported.
15. 846 F.2d at 418. An ERISA plan can employ an insurance company in one of three ways.
The labels "fully-insured," "partially-insured," and "self-insured" provide a suitable way of distin-
guishing between the three.
A fully insured plan purchases from the insurance company first dollar group insurance coverage
for plan members.
A partially insured plan, applied in one of two ways, only purchases coverage above a certain
level. "Excess-risk" coverage provides plan participants with additional payments directly from the
insurer after the plan's own claim limit is met. "Stop-loss" coverage reimburses the plan for pay-
ments it makes exceeding the plan limit.
A self-insured plan funds its own benefit coverage. These plans might employ an insurance com-
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the lower court and held: a self-insured plan16 is not subject to state
insurance regulations17 because of ERISA's deemer clause. 8 The
deemer clause is part of the overall ERISA preemption scheme.1 9 The
first preemption provision section 514(a), the "preemption clause," pro-
vides that ERISA supercedes any and all state laws "relating to" ERISA-
covered employee benefit plans.2' The "savings clause," section
514(b)(2)(A), limits section 514(a) by providing that no ERISA section
exempts any person from state law regulating insurance, banking or se-
curities.21 The "deemer clause," section 514(b)(2)(B), then modifies the
savings clause:
Neither an employee benefit plan .... nor any trust established under such a
plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer.... or
to be engaged in the business of insurane ... for the purposes of any law of
any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts,
banks, trust companies, or investment companies.22
Congress intended ERISA to supplant conflicting or inconsistent local
pany to administer the plan, but the plan's funds are separate. The insurance company only makes
the claims payment decisions. This situation is present in Reilly.
The name "self-insured" is only one way to describe a self-funded benefit plan. The Supreme
Court has titled such a program "uninsured." See infra note 40.
For a general description of these three categories and the preemption effect on each, see Engel,
ERISA: To Preempt or Not To Preempt, That is a Question, 22 TORT & INS. LJ. 431 (1986-87).
16. The line between a self-insured plan and a plan which purchases insurance may not be well
defined. For example, in Insurance Board Under the Social Insurance Plan v. Muir, 628 F. Supp
1537(M.D. Pa. 1986), rev'd, 819 F.2d 408 (3d Cir. 1987), the court distinguished a plan claiming to
use an insurance company in a purely administrative capacity from one which actually did. Id. at
1541. The distinction is critical, however. Crossing that line invokes questions not addressed by
Reilly or this Comment.
17. The holding in Reilly appears to cover all insurance regulations as they apply to benefit
plans; nothing in the text indicates the court singled out a certain class of insurance regulations.
Reilly, 846 F.2d at 425.
18. Id. at 425-26. For a discussion of the court's reasoning and other supporting evidence, see
infra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
19. See ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144.
Although the preemption provisions contain other clauses, only the preemption clause, savings
clause, and deemer clause are relevant to this Comment.
20. The exact wording of section (a) is as follows: "Except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section, the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and
all State laws in so far as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan ..
ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1194 (1982).
21. The exact wording is as follows: "Except as provided in subparagraph (B) [the deemer
clause], nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law
of any state which regulates insurance, banking or securities." ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(b)(2)(A) (1982).
22. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1982).
1989]
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or state employee benefits regulations.23 The preemption provisions,
which play a large role in achieving uniform benefit regulation, received
considerable attention in early benefit reform hearings.24 However, after
Congress molded them into their final form,25 these provisions received
little comment in reports or on the floor of either House.26 In light of
23. With the narrow exceptions specified in the bill, the substantive and enforcement pro-
visions of the conference substitute [for the preemption provisions] are intended to preempt
the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent
State and local regulation of employee benefit plans. This principle is intended to apply in
its broadest sense to all of State or local governments, or any instrumentality thereof,
which have the force or effect of law.
120 CONG. REc. 29,933 (1974) (Statement of Senator Williams), quoted in Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 107 S. Ct. 1549 at 1552 (1987).
24. For commentary on the preemption question in congressional hearings on earlier pension
reform attempts, compare Private Welfare and Pension Plan Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1045,
HR. 1046, and H. 16462 Before the General Subcomm on Labor of the House Comm. on Educa-
tion and Labor, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 481 (1969) (statement of George P. Shultz, Secretary of
Labor) (supporting one uniform pension law); Welfare and Pension Plan legislation: Hearings on
H. 2 and H.R. 462 before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and
Labor, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 651 (1973) (statement of Lauren Upson, Member, California
Banker's Association Committee on Employee Benefit Trusts) (calling for preemption of state laws
regulating the subject matter covered by the act); Hearings on H.R. 1045, H.R. 1046 and HR.
16462, pt. 1, at 110 (statement of Andrew J. Biemiller, Director, Department of Legislation, AFL-
CIO) (recommending preemption even with regard to state trust laws with respect to health, welfare,
pension, and profit-sharing plans) with Proposed Welfare & Pension Plan & Protectuib Act: Hearings
on HR. 5741 Before the General Subcomm on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
90th Cong., 2d Sess., (1968) at 338 (statement of Robert D. Haase, Commissioner of Insurance, State
of Wisconsin) (asking that states also be allowed to control pension plans) and pt., at 188-195 (state-
ment of Stanley Du Rose, Jr., Commission of Insurance of the State of Wisconsin, Hearings on
HR.2 and HR. 462) (stating it would be counter-productive to eliminate the large body of state law
on the subject).
25. H.R. 12906, introduced in the House on February 20, 1974, essentially contains the final
form of the preemption provisions. See infra note 26.
26. The general dearth of congressional commentary on the preemption provisions is due to the
late substitution of H.R. 12906 for the original H.R. 2. H.R. 12906, a substitute for Title I of the
Pension Reform Act, contained a new set of provisions for the federal law's effect on state laws.
Prior to this proposed substitute, H.R. 2 preempted only those state laws which would affect benefit
plans in the areas of federal regulation. H.R. 2, REP. No. 93-533, cited in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, 2181 (1976) [hereinafter ERISA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. H.R. 12906 added the deemer clause. Id. at 2761, 2921.
Illustrating the lack of consideration given the preemption provisions prior to conference commit-
tee, one finds in the entire explanation given by the committee reporting H.R. 12906 contains only
one relevant sentence: "All States' laws would be preempted except for those covering plans not
subject to titles II and III." Id. at 3293. The floor debate in the House on substituting 12906 for the
original H.R. 2 covers over two hundred pages, id. at 3351-593, but Congress heard only two ques-
tions on the preemption effect, and even these concerned only the new law's effect on pending litiga-
tion, id. at 3404, and the effective date of preemption, id. at 3404. The Joint Committee's report
included less than a page on the subject of preemption, most of which was a reiteration of the
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this dearth of legislative history, the few remarks made on the floor of the
Senate27 and post-enactment treatment of the deemer clause 28 have sig-
nificant weight.
The Supreme Court defined the scope of the preemption clause in
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc..29 Shaw involved state-mandated insurance
benefits."a In interpreting the language "relat[ing] to any employee bene-
clause's language. Id. at 4650. The most lengthy remarks came in speeches before both Houses in
the debates following the Joint Committee's report. See infra note 27.
27. Several remarks made in both the House and Senate during the debate on the Joint Com-
mittee's bill shed light on Congress' intent concerning preemption.
In the House, Representative Dent called the preemption provisions "the crowning achievement
of this legislation, the reservation to Federal authority the sole power to regulate the field of em-
ployee benefit plans. With the preemption of the field, we round out the protection afforded partici-
pants by eliminating the threat of conflicting and inconsistent State and local regulation." 120 CONG.
REc. 29,197 (1974), reprinted in ERISA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 26, at 4670.
28. Although generally post-enactment treatment of a law in Congress might not be apposite,
in two instances Congress acted, or failed to act, on ERISA in a way that bears mentioning.
The Joint Committee report on ERISA specified a post-enactment study of the preemption provi-
sions: "The substitute provides that the congressional Pension Task Force is to study this provision
and report back to the labor committees of the Congress on the results of its study." ERISA LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 26, at 4650. Hence, Congress enacted ERISA with the plan to study
its progress and correct if necessary. The Pension Task Force did review the first several years under
ERISA, and their report summarized their view on the deemer clause as follows:
[Tlhe deemed language was utilized to create an irrebuttable presumption that these [em-
ployee benefit] plans are not insurance, trust companies, etc., for the purposes of state
regulation... [S]hould [this] understanding of the language in section 514, when read in
conjunction with the legislative history, not prove correct or desirable, then of course fur-
ther congressional action would be necessary to protect the policy in section 514(a).
ERISA Oversight Task Force on Welfare and Pension Plans, 46-48 of the Activity Report of the
Committee on Education and Labor of the House of Representatives, Report No. 94-1785.
The Pension Task Force findings deserve attention beyond that normally accorded a post-enact-
ment pronouncement. First, they specifically call on Congress to change the law if their understand-
ing is not correct. Second, and perhaps more important, the very terms under which Congress
enacted the preemption provisions invoked this Task Force's authority to make findings concerning
the proper preemptive role of ERISA. The Task Force stated its understanding of the law, and
Congress allowed the deemer clause to remain intact.
The next congressional action worthy of note was an attempt in 1979 by a number of legislators to
revise ERISA's preemption provisions. These revisions were part of an ERISA improvement plan
numbered S. 209, 125 CONG.REc. 933 (1974). Although S. 209 changed the preemption provisions,
it did not affect the deemer clause at all. Id. at 937. The absence of any attempt to change the
deemer clause is meaningful in light of both the Pension Task Force's report and the prior Ninth
Circuit decision in Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1978) (affirming a decision
that ERISA preempts state insurance laws as they apply to self-insured plans, due to the deemer
clause). The congressmen involved were aware of judicial activity on the preemption question. See
125 CONG. REc. 947 (1979) (statement of Sen. Williams). Thus, failure to consider amending or
deleting the deemer clause stands as evidence of satisfaction with the current judicial interpretation.
29. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
30. The question presented by Shaw was "whether the [state] Human Rights Law and Disabil-
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fit plan" in section 514(a), the Court applied the phrase's "normal
sense."31 By doing so, the Court found the language preempts32 any law
that "has a connection with or reference to ... a plan."' 33
Having set out such a broad preemption standard, the Supreme Court
next addressed the exception created by the savings clause. 34 In Metro-
politan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,35 the Court found that a
Massachusetts statute mandating minimum insurance benefits for resi-
dents insured under a general insurance policy related to ERISA benefit
plans.36 The statute was not preempted, though because it fell within the
savings clause as "regulat[ing] insurance" by controlling the substance of
'insurance plans. Thus, notwithstanding ERISA's preemption clause, the
savings clause barred the statute's preemption. 7 Substantive regulations
aimed directly at the insurance industry may indirectly affect benefit
plans.38 In dicta,39 the Court noted its ruling distinguished insured plans
from self-insured plans, as the latter would not be open to state
regulation.'
ity Benefits Law 'relate to' employee benefit plans within the meaning of § 514(a) [of ERISA]....
and if so, whether any exception in ERISA saves them from preemption." Id. at 96. Thb laws in
question mandated certain non-discriminatory coverage in insurance policies. Id. at 88,
31. Id. at 96-97.
32. At one point the debate was whether "supersede" in the preemption clause meant ERISA
preempted all state benefit plan law or merely preempted those state laws whose area of regulation
ERISA addressed, see Brummond, Federal Preemption of State Insurance Regulations Under ER-
ISA, 62 IOWA L. REv. 57 (1976). The Court in Shaw defined the scope of preemption: "Section
514(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), pre-empts 'any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan covered by ERISA." 463 U.S. at 91.
33. Id. The Court based this reading on a common sense view of the preemption provisions as
a whole. "To interpret § 514(a) to preempt only state laws specifically designed to affect employee
benefit plans would be to ignore the remainder of § 514. It would have been unnecessary to exempt
generally applicable state criminal statutes for example, if § 514(a) applied only to state laws dealing
specifically with ERISA plans." Id. at 98.
34. The savings clause provides an exception to the general preemption clause. 29 U.S.C.
1144b(2)(A), see supra text accompanying note 21.
35. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
36. Id. at 739. The plans in question in Metropolitan Life were "insured" plans. For a compar-
ison to "self-insured" plans, such as the one at issue in Reilly, see supra note 15.
37. Id. at 739-46. The Court found no congressional intent to limit the savings clause preemp-
tion to statutes affecting insurance administration. Id.
38. Id. at 741.
39. For an explanation of why the Court's pronouncement on the deemer clause is dicta, see
infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
40. We are aware that our decision results in a distinction between insured and uninsured
plans, leaving the former open to indirect regulation while the latter are not. By doing so
we merely give life to a distinction created by Congress in the "deemer clause," a distinc-
tion Congress is aware of and one it has chosen not to alter.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss1/10
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In Pilot Life Insurance Company v. Dedeaux, 1 the Supreme Court
limited this reading of the savings clause. The Court announced only to
the extent that laws regulate insurance would such laws escape preemp-
tion.42 The new interpretation prevented the plaintiff from bringing a
state law tort claim in order to receive punitive damages from a plan
insurer who failed to pay a claim.43
Other than dicta,' the Supreme Court has not spoken on the deemer
clause, but the Ninth Circuit took up the question as early as 1978. In
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes,4" that court, following the reasoning of
the district court below,46 found the clause specifically exempted self-
insured plans from all state insurance regulations.47 The district court
reasoned that Congress clearly meant to preclude a state from calling a
benefit plan an "insurer" and invoking the savings clause in order to
avoid ERISA's preemption.4" Other circuits have since interpreted the
deemer clause in like fashion.49
Despite such authority, in 1987 the Sixth Circuit, in Northern Group
Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 747.
Reilly uses this dicta for support of its decision. See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
41. 107 S. Ct. 1549 (1987).
42. Id. at 1553. Pilot Life, like Metropolitan Life, involved an "insured plan." See supra note
15.
43. Id. at 1554. Plaintiffs sought punitive damages as a result of the insurance carrier's alleged
"bad faith." For an explanation of the Court's holding that the state bad faith claim did not regulate
insurance, see infra note 83. In a companion case decided on the same day, the Court also rejected
claims for breach of contract, retaliatory discharge and wrongful termination of disability benefits.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
These decisions have profound implications for plaintiffs in any action against plan administrators.
The diminished possibility of recovering punitive damages may deter many plaintiffs and their attor-
neys from filing claims against administrators.
44. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
45. 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1979).
46. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977). The Court of Appeals
adopted the district court's reasoning in toto on the question involved. 571 F.2d at 504.
47. 571 F.2d at 504. The district court reached its decision by looking both at the plain mean-
ing of the deemer clause, 425 F.Supp. at 1297, and its legislative history, id. at 1298-300.
48. Id. at 1300.
49. See, eg., General Motors Corp. v. California State Bd. of Equalization, 815 F.2d 1305 (9th
Cir. 1987); Wisconsin Educ. Ass'n Ins. Trust v. Iowa State Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 804 F.2d 1059
(8th Cir. 1986); Light v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 790 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1986);
Powell v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Virginia, 780 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1985), cert denied,
476 U.S. 1170 (1986). Contra Insurance Bd. Under the Social Ins. Plan v. Muir, 628 F. Supp. 1537
(M.D. Pa. 1986), rev'd, 819 F.2d 408 (3d Cir. 1987).
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Services, Inc. v. Auto Insurance Co.," ° allowed a state insurance regula-
tion51 to affect a self-insured employee benefit plan.5 2 The court held a
state insurance regulation will apply to self-insured plans where no in-
dependent federal interest in national uniformity exists."3 After finding
that the Michigan insurance regulation fell within the savings clause,5 4
the court determined the state could also regulate plans acting as insur-
ers." The Court reached this conclusion by balancing what it found to
be conflicting intents in the savings and deemer clauses.5 6
The Seventh Circuit, in Reilly v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield United of
Wisconsin, 7 was the first appellate court decision since Northern Group
50. 833 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1987), rehg denied, sub nom., Northern Group Services, Inc. v. State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 9 EBC 1376 (1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 1754 (1988).
51. The regulation in question in Northern Group was a coordination of benefits law. This law,
under the interpretation of Michigan state courts, made no-fault insurance coverage secondary to
other health and accident coverage. The plaintiff plans nevertheless made no-fault liability primary
and their own liability secondary. Thus, the statute actually changed the terms of the plan. See
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3109a (West 1983).
52. The court in Northern Group did not state that insurance regulations can always apply to
benefit plans. Its balancing of rational interest in uniformity with state need to regulate insurance
merely happened to deny preemption in this case.
53. "[F]or the deemer clause to override the savings clause in a given case, there must be some
ERISA interest in uniformity to outweigh the McCarran-Ferguson interest in state regulation of
insurance." Northern Group, 833 F.2d at 95. The court thus chose to see the two clauses in conflict.
For a logical and consistent way to read the two clauses, see infra note 79.
54. Id. at 89-90.
55. Id. at 90-91. The Northern Group court deceptively relied on Employer's Ass'n v. New
Jersey, 601 F. Supp. 232 (D.NJ.) (1985) as saying "state coordination of benefits [is] not barred by
the deemer clause." Northern Group, 833 F.2d at 95. Employer's Ass'n does support the conclusion
that a coordination of benefits law is a state insurance regulation under the savings clause. Em-
ployer'sAss'n does not, however, involve self-insured plans, but insured plans. Employer'sAss'n, 601
F. Supp. at 236. Thus, Northern Group's assessment of Employer's Association's holding is at best
overstated.
56. The Northern Group opinion contains a tripartite analysis:
First, the court found no clear intent by Congress to preempt state law. Northern Group, 833 F.2d
at 91. Without this clear intent, state law presumptively stands.
Second, Congress expressed a desire in ERISA § 514 (d)("Nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed to alter.., any law of the United State") to leave federal law intact. The McCarran-
Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011-1015 (1982), specifically leaves insurance regulation to the states.
Therefore, a plan which mimics the business of insurance will still be regulable by the states. To
strengthen this interpretation, the court pointed out that Congress specifically used the term "busi-
ness of insurance" in the deemer clause to echo the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 883 F.2d at 91-92.
Third, the legislative history offers little to contradict this interpretation. Id. at 92.
The court then concluded that this tension between the state's right to regulate insurance and the
federal government's right to regulate plans results in a balance. See supra note 53 and accompany-
ing text. Because Michigan's law does not hurt the plan in a way feared by Congress (i.e. regulating
the plan's content), it can affect the plan itself. 833 F.2d at 93.
57. 846 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1988).
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to consider the deemer clause specifically. On appeal, the court dealt
only with the state law tort claim of bad faith and the plaintiffs' demand
for punitive damages.5 8 The court disregarded completely whether these
claims regulated insurance under the savings clause.5 9 Instead, the Sev-
enth Circuit adopted the view that ERISA preempts any state law ap-
plied to a self-insured plan.'
In rejecting plaintiffs' arguments, the court offered little more than a
cursory treatment of the deemer clause question.61 After reciting the
preemption, savings and deemer clauses, the court pointed only to dicta
in Metropolitan Life v. Massachusetts for support of its result.62 In Met-
ropolitan Life, Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, strongly indi-
cated the Court's leaning on the interpretation of the deemer clause.6
The Reilly court's interpretation would apparently preclude state insur-
ance regulations from applying to plans themselves. The Reilly court
further relied on Metropolitan Life in that the Court recognized that the
state of Massachusetts, by never applying the law in question to benefit
plans directly, acknowledged the law's invalidity as it applied to self-in-
sured plans.M
The court's analysis in Reilly is deficient in two respects. First, in rely-
ing solely on the dicta in Metropolitan Life,"5 the court ignored other,
more satisfactory rationales for its decision.6 6 Second, in examining the
58. Id. at 425.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 423-26.
61. Supporting Reilly's decision, a number of circuits have found the same result in addressing
state regulation of self-insured plans. See supra note 49. An appreciable amount of legislative his-
tory is also available on the interpretation of the deemer clause. See infra notes 72-76 and accompa-
nying text. For a full treatment of the ways the court could have substantiated its opinion, see infra
notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
62. 846 F.2d at 425-26.
63. We are aware that our decision results in a distinction between insured and uninsured
plans, leaving the former open to indirect regulation while the latter are not. By doing so
we merely give life to a distinction created by Congress in the "deemer clause," a distinc-
tion Congress is aware of and one it has chosen not to alter.
Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 747, cited in Reilly, 846 F.2d at 425-26.
64. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 735 n.14.
65. In looking to the Supreme Court for guidance, the Seventh Circuit could have quoted fur-
ther dicta in Pilot Life to the effect that the deemer clause would preclude a Reilly claim from being
saved. Describing the three preemption clauses, the Court said, "[t]he deemer clause makes clear
that a state law that 'purport[s] to regulate insurance cannot deem an employee benefit plan to be an
insurance company." 107 S. Ct. 1552. Although this passage is at first blush a mere restatement of
the law, it apparently contradicts the conclusion reached by the Sixth Circuit in Northern Group, see
supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text, and thus supports Reilly's outcome.
66. See infra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
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deemer clause, the court reached an issue it need not have addressed.6 7
In Metropolitan Life, the deemer clause was not before the Supreme
Court for interpretation.6" Thus Justice Blackmun's statements are
purely dicta. 69 Likewise, Massachusetts' failure to enforce its law against
self-insured plans was not evidence requiring the Court's interpretation
for resolution on the merits. 70 Nevertheless the Seventh Circuit inappro-
priately cited Metropolitan Life as if its holding involved self-insured
plans.71
The Reilly court ignored other justifications for its decision. ERISA's
legislative history does not often address the preemption provisions.72
The conference committee's report on the bill, however, makes clear the
compromise reached by the committee was subject to a study by the Pen-
sion Task Force.73 The fact that Congress passed this clause with such
assurances adds weight to the Task Force's study which favors the Reilly
decision.74 Also, an attempt to amend the preemption clauses in 1979
did not address the deemer clause at all.7 5 This decision to leave the
deemer clause unamended is significant because it follows both the Pen-
sion Task Force's report76 and a prior circuit court of appeals decision.77
Additionally, commentators have noted it is likely Congress intended the
67. See infra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
68. The question in Metropolitan Life was whether a state-mandated benefit law would apply to
insurance packages sold to a benefit plan. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 732. The Court clearly
recognized the difference between plans purchasing insurance and "self-insured" plans. Id.
69. Emphasizing the inconclusiveness of the Court's dicta concerning the deemer clause, both
Northern Group and Reilly quote the same Metropolitan Life language and yet reach the opposite
conclusion. Northern Group, 833 F.2d at 91; Reilly, 846 F.2d 425-26.
70. See supra note 36. Because the case involved only plans that purchased insurance, Massa-
chusetts' treatment of self-insured plans was irrelevant, at least with respect to the law's application
to those plans.
71. Note how Reilly cites the Metropolitan Life Court: "If a plan purchases insurance, as op-
posed to being self-insured, it is 'directly affected by state laws that regulate the insurance industry.'
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts." Reilly, 846 F.2d at 425 (emphasis added).
72. See supra note 26.
73. "The substitute provides that the congressional Pension Task Force is to study this provi-
sion and report back to the labor committees." CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 2, PENSION RE-
FoRM, H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 383 (1974), reprinted in ERISA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 26, at 4650.
74. For a summary of the Pension Task Force study, see supra note 28.
75. For circumstances surrounding Senate bill S-209, see supra note 28.
76. See supra note 28.
77. Hewlett Packard Co. v. Barnes, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1978). For an explanation of the
significance of this decision, see supra note 28.
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result reached in Reilly.78 Finally, a common sense reading of the stat-
ute's text illustrates Reilly's conclusion.7 9
Another flaw in the approach the Seventh Circuit took is the clause it
chose to interpret. The Supreme Court has never addressed the deemer
clause on the merits."' The Court has, however, spoken on the scope of
the savings clause.8 1 In Pilot Life, 2 the Court held ERISA preempts
state tort laws regulating insurance contracts, despite the savings
clause.83 Although Pilot Life concerned a plan purchasing its insurance,
rather than a self-insured plan,"4 this distinction does not alter Pilot
Life's application to the Reilly facts." Thus, the Reilly court could have
78. Engel, supra note 15, at 431; Note, ERISA Preemption of State Mandated-Providor Laws,
1985 DuKE L. J. 1194, 1196; Note, supra note 12, at 600.
79. The court in Northern Group Services, Inc. v. Auto Insurance Co., 833 F.2d 85 (6th Cir.
1987), see supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text, chose to see the savings and deemer clauses as
conflicting and requiring a balancing test. See supra note 53. A careful reading of the two clauses
reveals, however, that they are perfectly consistent under Reilly's solution.
The preemption clause announces the general rule that ERISA preempts all state laws relating to
a plan in any way. The savings clause then excepts from this general rule areas of traditional state
regulation, namely the fields of insurance, banking and securities regulation. The deemer clause
carefully circumscribes this exception by disallowing classification of a plan as an insurance com-
pany for the purposes of regulation. Balancing the savings and deemer clause is not necessary under
this reading.
Further, one can compare the decision in Northern Group to Reilly despite the different laws
involved. Northern Group concerned a mandated-providor type law (see supra note 51) whereas
Reilly involved a transaction regulation. Nevertheless, Reilly's solution would still be appropriate
for Northern Group. The question presented by each is whether a state can regulate directly a benefit
plan (a statutory regulation in Northern Group, a decisional law in Reilly). The deemer clause ap-
pears to make no distinction between the two. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22. Also, at
least one commentator feels the courts should treat these two types of laws the same. See Engel,
supra note 15, at 439-43.
80. Supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
81. In Metropolitan Life and Pilot Life, the Court discussed the scope of the savings clause. See
supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
82. The Court decided Pilot Life in April, 1987, more than a year before the Reilly decision.
107 S. Ct. 1599.
83. In Pilot Life, appellee argued that the Mississippi law of bad faith regulates insurance. Id.
at 1553. Although Mississippi identified the bad faith tort with the insurance industry, id., Justice
O'Connor found its roots were general tort and contract principles. Id. at 1554. Therefore, "[a]ny
breach of contract, and not merely breach of an insurance contract, may lead to liability for punitive
damages under Mississippi law." Id. For this reason the Court held the law did not specifically
regulate insurance.
84. There is no reason to believe the Court would treat such tort claims differently in the case of
a self-insured plan like the one in Reilly. The deemer clause itself makes the only distinction between
self-insured and insured plans, and then only to enhance preemption for the self-insured plans.
Hence, the rationale in Pilot Life is equally persuasive when applied to a self-insured plan.
85. Although the common law progression in Wisconsin was different from Mississippi's as
O'Connor described it, see supra note 11, the basis for such principles of tort and contract interaction
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rebutted the plaintiffs' claim without ever reaching the question of the
deemer clause.
s6
The controversy over interpretation of the deemer clause has far-
reaching effects on many employers utilizing self-insured plans.87 Like-
wise, a Supreme Court ruling in line with Reilly could severely limit a
plaintiff's chances for punitive damages in a suit against a self-insured
plan.8" Despite the cursory analysis89 presented by the Seventh Circuit
on the deemer clause, Reilly does appear to proffer the correct interpreta-
tion of the clause.90 Through the deemer clause, Congress intended to
existed long before the Anderson v. Continental Insurance Co. opinion, 85 Wis. 2d 675, 271 N.W. 2d
368 (Wis. 1979); see supra note 11. That the Wisconsin court reads Anderson as merely a specific
instance of the general applicability of punitive tort damages in certain contract breaches is now
clear after the decision in Autumn Grove Joint Venture v. Rachlin, 138 Wis. 2d 273, 405 N.W.2d
759 (Wis. App.), rehg denied, 416 N.W. 2d 65 (1987), see supra note 11. O'Connor and the Court
would therefore reach the same conclusion had the Wisconsin law of bad faith been before them.
86. This approach would have been advantageous for two reasons. First, the Reilly court
would have had a clear Supreme Court precedent to cite. Second, a sequential reading of the pre-
emption clauses would suggest this response. Having found the law does "relate to" a benefit plan,
the court would then have read the savings clause. Although this clause does begin with the phrase
"(e)xcept as provided in subparagraph (B) [the deemer clause]," the court should nevertheless have
addressed the savings clause first. If the clause did not apply, the court had no reason to reach the
exception to this exclusion.
87. Prior to the Northern Group decision, employers choosing to self-insure their benefit plans
were confident that they needed worry about only one set of regulations applied by the federal ER-
ISA law. Logically, many employers chose self-insured plans for the advantages thus presented: a
uniform regulation in any state, freedom from state interference, and little likelihood of an adverse
award of punitive damages. Northern Group, with its balancing test, would destroy this confidence,
leaving in its place a constant question as to which state laws outweigh the federal interest in uni-
formity. Reilly returned to the majority view that the deemer clause will invoke preemption of state
laws as applied to self-insured plans. Assuredly, many employers and employee associations await
the Supreme Court's resolution.
88. Members of the Supreme Court are acutely aware of the problem of eroding plaintiffs puni-
tive damage opportunities under ERISA. In Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. v. Russell, 473 U.S.
134 (1985), the concurring opinion noted with approval that the Court explicitly left unanswered
whether § 502(a)(3) allowed a plaintiff punitive damages. Id. at 157-58 (Brennan, J., concurring).
See supra note 12.
89. Supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 72-82 and accompanying text. The reasoning in Northern Group can be
criticized on several grounds. For example, the court in Northern Group reasoned that ERISA
§ 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1982), which insists ERISA not be construed to impair any federal
law, barred the deemer clause from preempting state regulation of the business of insurance, as the
McCarran-Ferguson Act leaves the regulation of insurance to the states. 833 F.2d at 92. Such a
reading makes little sense, as Congress has not altered the state regulation of insurance. The deemer
clause merely removes self-insured benefit plans from the scope of state insurance regulation. Also,
the Sixth Circuit in Northern Group gave inadequate weight to the Pension Task Force report ex-
plaining the deemer clause. 833 F.2d at 92. See supra note 28. Congress chose not to amend the
deemer clause while aware of the Task Force's statement on the deemer clause. See supra note 28.
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protect benefit plans from direct state regulation. Their effort, however,
eliminates one more device protecting employees against fraudulent plan
operation. 91 The problem grows worse as the courts remove more and
more policing devices for administrative abuse of self-insured plans.
Faced with employees who are ever more helpless against abuse, Con-
gress may soon be forced to take action to put teeth back into ERISA.
J.G.
91. Preempting state law entirely eliminates many common law actions allowing punitive dam-
ages. This limitation in turn decreases the incentive for plan administrators to operate in good faith.
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